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Cluster Munitions:
rt
Should They be Banned?
Cluster munitions have been used in at least 23 countries, produced in 33 and stockpiled in over 70; their
submunitions number into the billions.1 They cause lasting humanitarian problems and have recently been
the target of campaigns to ban their use. This article aims to summarize the history, utility, legacy and
legislation surrounding cluster munitions.2
by Henry Dowlen, MB BS

A

ccording to the recent Dublin conference, a cluster munition can now officially be defined as “a conventional munition
that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions,
each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive
submunitions.”3 Throughout the history of the use of cluster munitions,
their technical specifications, post-conflict legacies and the legislation
with respect to the ongoing Oslo Process have been debated. This process, launched by Norway in 2007, aimed to negotiate a ban on cluster munitions and achieved recent success—the convention was agreed
upon and will be open for signature in December 2008.
While there are strong opponents and proponents of the clustermunition ban, it is only with due consideration of their military utility
versus humanitarian imperatives that a solution can be devised. Limited empirical data is currently available on either their military efficacy
or the effects on human morbidity and mortality rates; further research
into these factors is needed.

History
Cluster munitions date to World War II when German forces
dropped “butterf ly bombs.” These air-deployed munitions held antipersonnel bomblets that could detonate on impact or be set for delayed
and anti-handling settings. Civilians were specifically targeted (bomblets were camouflaged to kill farmers at harvest time4), and unexploded
bomblets were found too unstable to disarm.
It was not until the Second Indochina War (also known as the
Vietnam-American War) that cluster munitions were used again—most
notably in Laos—with any significance. Between 2 and 3 million tonnes
(1.9 to 2.9 million tons) of ordnance were dropped over Laos from 1964
to 1973, much of which was cluster munitions that subsequently failed
to explode. In 2005, the recorded casualties increased from 100 a year to
almost 200, an increase attributed to a rise in the price of scrap metal,
which enticed scrap-metal collectors to take greater risks by trying to
recover the metal from unexploded ordnance. The number of casualties
was later reduced because more economic opportunities became available, according to Landmine Monitor.
Aside from the butterf ly bombs in WWII, modern cluster bombs
were designed in the context of the Cold War to attack large military
formations; furthermore, they act as force multipliers, reducing the
logistics and manpower risked for a military goal. 5 The footprint of a
single cluster munition can be in the region of half a square kilometer (nearly one-quarter square mile). The rationale for cluster bomb use
is important, as the military efficacy of them is in some dispute. “No
detailed military study of the military utility of these weapons … has
ever been made public.”4

An undetonated cluster submunition with parachute deployed, lying on the ground outside an Afghan village.
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Clearance is hampered by a lack of access to and visibility of the
explosive remnants of war. Indiscriminate use and high failure rates
are cited as the two areas of concern giving grounds for humanitarian
scrutiny of cluster weapons, 6 and according to research by the Cluster
Munitions Coalition, a coalition working to ban cluster munitions internationally, at least 60 percent of casualties from unexploded cluster
munitions are children.1
During the first Gulf War in 1991, over 13 million submunitions
were used, 6 of which around 400,000 bomblets failed to detonate 4 due
to factors such as poor manufacture, poor use and inclement weather
conditions.7 With regard to this last factor, some cluster munitions’ selfarming capacities are particularly susceptible to high winds or variations in altitude when dropped—for instance if conditions do not allow
the munitions’ subunits to spin properly, they cannot arm and detonate
as intended. During the post-Gulf War cleanup of unexploded ordnance, seven U.S. troops were killed in one accident.8
Records from Kosovo in 1999 suggest that cluster munitions were a
weapon of convenience, while post-conflict studies concluded that the
attacks had little immediate impact.9 In 2003, Human Rights Watch
criticized the number of cluster-munition attacks by the United States
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and the United Kingdom forces that affected civilians.10
After the first Gulf War, however, the military recorded
that “Iraqi units were devastated and demoralized. … The
fact that the ground war lasted only four days … can be
largely attributed to the effect of cluster munitions.” 4
Scope
Cluster munitions can deploy large amounts of explosives over a wide area and can be ground- or air-launched.
They are also multipurpose weapons with variants that
affect vehicles, roads, personnel and electrical stations
(deploying reels of conductive wire). 4 They can contain
chemical weapons or lay landmines. Initially intended to break up concentrations of armored vehicles and
infantry,11 they have evolved for a variety of uses. In general, they consist of a canister, which breaks open to release submunitions over an area known as a “footprint.”
Billions of cluster submunitions are stockpiled12 in over 70
states and produced by 33 countries today.13
Older models of cluster munitions are simpler and generally do not have guidance or self-destruct mechanisms.
Submunition fuzes are armed through the spinning motion that occurs after they are jettisoned from the parent
casing, and malfunction can occur during either of these
processes. The “all-ways acting fuze” is designed to ensure the device explodes even if it does not land in the correct alignment; however, it also acts as an anti-handling
device, making UXO much more likely to detonate with a
small movement.4
Failure rates for cluster munitions are so high that they
are accounted for in the planning of military operations.13
In the past 42 years, nine countries confirmed the use of at
least 440 million cluster submunitions, with average failure rates between 5 and 30 percent. A minimum of 22 to
132 million would therefore have become ERW.14 Several
operational factors inf luence the reliability of submunitions, including poor delivery technique, age of the submunition, weather and terrain.13 Recent tests in Norway
have shown that self-destruct features are often not as reliable as manufacturers claim.15
The United Kingdom has agreed to withdraw munitions from service that cannot self-neutralize, cannot discriminate between targets, have explosive content or have
numerous submunitions.16 China and Russia have indicated they would not replace all their submunitions. Russia
claimed that modern cluster munitions are reliable, safe
and effective, and it might be better to discuss munition
design and best practices for usage rather than implement
new legislation.17
So many cluster munitions are held by so many states,
it would be understandable to say that their military utility has grown beyond question. This argument, however,
has not to date been made coherently.18 Cluster munitions
apply an area effect (i.e., the footprint of the attack) for a
military advantage; therefore, the effects of any attack
should be in proportion to the target and the importance
of the military goal. Cluster munitions used in an area of
civilian and military cohabitation, however, almost guarantee civilian casualties.13 The military efficacy of cluster
munitions has been further questioned after the deaths of
U.S. troops during and after the first Gulf War, killed by
their own UXO, not to mention the impediment to mobil-
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Close-up of an undetonated cluster submunition.

ity when operating in contaminated areas.19 There have also been incidents of other
troop casualties from cluster munitions in post-conflict situations, including NATO
troops in Kosovo.
Legacy
The main type of submunition that was dropped on Laos has a life expectancy in
the soil of approximately 100 years, and while today some are found badly corroded,
others look almost new.20 There is growing interest in the effects on ERW by the natural environment and also the effects of removing them: “The consequences are …likely to cause an ERW problem resulting in … damage to the environment.”21
Despite advances in clearance vehicles and the use of special detecting animals,
clearance generally must be done manually. A recent environmental impact study
undertaken by the United Nations Mine Action Service found that removal operations
significantly damage the environment, and long-term damage arises from destruction
of flora, contamination of water systems and damage to the natural habitats of wildlife. 22 Disposal of ERW by burning or detonation releases huge quantities of metal
fragments, dust and nitrogen oxides into the environment, 23 although it is possible
to incinerate ERW and reclaim the energy, or utilize the chemicals for other purposes.24 Richard Kidd, former Director of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
in the United States Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, argues
that “the problems associated with cluster munitions are not nearly as bad as other
ERW … [and] there simply is no large-scale demand for financial resources to clear
cluster munitions.”17
On the other hand, Lao farmers are gradually expanding the land they use, and
this involves a risk of exploding UXO, resulting in serious injury or death. In case
studies carried out by Richard Moyes of Landmine Action and the Cluster Munitions
Coalition, land is abandoned only if other economic options are available. People
without options are forced to use contaminated land by necessity. 25, 14 ERW degrade
habitats by altering food chains, making conservation of protected areas difficult, and
polluting the soil and water supplies. 25 There are those, however, that argue that the
very presence of ERW is protective of the natural environment, as it prevents human
development, which may otherwise destroy natural ecosystems.
Some evidence from Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere shows there is a significantly greater risk of being killed by a submunition than by an anti-personnel landmine.12 In a 2006 study by Handicap International, casualties from cluster munitions
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From 1993–2007, the United
States donated over US$1.3 billion
toward humanitarian mine action (including cluster munitions abatement)20 and the United
Kingdom has contributed significant resources to understanding the extent of the problem as well. Many NGOs, however,
feel that the users of cluster munitions have done little to contribute to
understanding the harm caused by these weapons.6

An undetonated cluster submunition lying on the ground outside an Afghan village.

were greater than the predicted value based on landmine data, as well as
being disproportionately comprised of civilians (98 percent).14 It should
be noted, however, that Steve Mannion for The HALO Trust concluded
there is far less threat from landmines to civilians, and that submunitions are unlikely to detonate unless handled or thrown. 26 Once people
realize what cluster munitions are, they can often be avoided more easily
than other UXO unless the cluster munitions are hidden by dense vegetation or other means.
Those most likely to disturb and detonate ERW are farmers, children
and scrap-metal collectors. Injuries sustained include multiple traumatic amputations of limbs, burns, puncture by shrapnel, ruptured eardrums and blindness.25
The International Committee of the Red Cross observed that those
killed or injured by submunitions in Kosovo were 4.9 times more likely to be under 14 years of age than victims of anti-personnel mines.
According to the ICRC, “This may be due to the fact that such submunitions are often brightly coloured, lying on the ground and assumed to
be duds.” 27
ERW pose a crippling threat to the development of a community. 28
There are costs incurred not only in clearing land for use, but also in
caring for those injured and loss of land use due to fear of ERW. Prioritization of clearance, focusing on the number of square kilometers of productive land that has been lost, 24 is important where it is not possible to
clear every square meter of contaminated land.20

Legislation
Recommendations based on existing legislation have been put forward to guide best practice when cluster munitions are deployed, including responsibilities to provide information and warnings to civilians
both during and after conflict. 25 Despite these recommendations, there
is no agreement over which rules of international humanitarian law are
relevant, although legislation exists to cover indiscriminate weapons
and obligations to clear landmines.
Additional Protocol I (1977) of the Geneva Conventions sets out
rules regarding distinction, discrimination, proportionality and feasibility in the use of weapons.29 Many feel cluster weapons violate the principles of proportionality, distinction and discrimination,11, 29 and there is
40 years’ worth of evidence concerning consistent civilian harm.7
In 1993, the 1980 U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons30 was updated with a fifth protocol on ERW. 31 Adopted in 2003 and
entering into force in late 2006, 32 it was criticized for not being strongly
worded enough.25 The perceived weaknesses in the CCW were the catalyst for formation of the Oslo Process, which takes a harder line toward
cluster munitions.1
Other legislation of relevance is the Rio Declaration of 1992,
Principle 24 of which states that “warfare is inherently destructive of
sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law
providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and
cooperate in its further development.”33
Corporate social responsibility is also relevant, especially relating
to companies producing cluster bombs. This requires voluntary engagement, although the U.K. government believes this is how business should
account for economic, social and environmental impacts.34
The Ottawa Convention, 35 under which signatories agree to ban
anti-personnel landmines, holds some parallels for cluster bombs, but
the blurring of boundaries between the two types of weapons can be unhelpful as there are some distinct differences. For practical purposes,
cluster munitions do not fall under the Ottawa Convention, and therefore some believe they require specific legislation.36
One notable absentee from the Ottawa Convention and discussion relating to cluster munitions is the United States. It is the world’s largest
single financial contributor to mine and UXO clearance, yet many still
feel it pays lip service to the cluster munitions issue. 37 The United States
still produces, uses and sells cluster munitions; however, in 2007 the United States placed restrictions on the sale or transfer of these weapons.38
Ban Initiative
The Cluster Munition Coalition was founded at The Hague in
November 2003 to protect civilians from cluster munitions; it consists
of around 300 civil-society organizations. 39 It was bolstered by Norway’s
declaration in late 2006 that it would work toward an international
ban, following frustration with a lack of effort by the CCW (negotiations which are ongoing).18 In February 2007 the United Nations, CMC,
ICRC, some interested countries, and other humanitarian organizations met in Oslo to discuss means of moving toward a ban. This became
known as the Oslo Process, which aims to “prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.”4 Follow-up meetings have occurred with the aim
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First, there are ban proponents who feel that
these weapons will always cause unnecessary civilian harm without more fundamental changes to individual states’ practices, and
they advocate for nothing less than a total
ban.7 Second are opponents of the ban—most
notably the United States, whose stance hardened against any new convention that specifically sought to ban cluster munitions in
the run up to the February 2007 Oslo meeting. 37 This is, however, an over-simplification;
in 2007 the U.S. Congress took steps to place
controls on cluster munition stockpiles,
design, manufacture and exportation. Finally,
there are moderates who see compromise as
the only viable resolution for the issue. The
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a
recent publication, stated, “Today, no serious actors advocate a total prohibition against
all … cluster munitions.”11 Indeed, it is possible that pressure for the over-rigorous application of humanitarian principles in war to
cluster munitions, without a realization that
states will continue to use area-effect weapons, will weaken the Oslo Process.
See Endnotes, page 112
Aerial photograph showing craters over impact site of a cluster munition.

of concluding the process by the end of 2008;
an agreement was reached at the cluster munitions conference held in Dublin, Ireland, in
May 2008. (See additional article on this subject on page 65.)2
In the author’s opinion, an outright ban
on cluster munitions is unlikely to provide a
workable solution to the humanitarian problems posed by these weapons because it would
likely be ignored by many states.
Possible Solutions
One solution that has been proposed is to
reduce the quantity of submunitions per cluster munition, leading to a lower likelihood
of leaving ERW. For instance, Germany has
proposed the use of cluster munitions with
less than 10 submunitions that are sensorfuzed. 28 A more radical measure is using
non-explosive “kinetic energy rods” in cluster munitions, which can pose no ERW threat
as they mechanically destroy targets to which
they are guided to. 40 Finally, a move from
mechanical to electrical fuzes would reduce
the likelihood of events in which failure
might occur.4
Definition of cluster munitions is important; some states feel a weapon should not be
referred to as a cluster munition unless it has
a minimum number of subunits, which would
allow them to possess “area-effect weapons”
that are not defined as cluster munitions.

There is some logic to this argument as, below
a certain number of submunitions, the problems associated with cluster munitions dwindle into insignificance, or to the significance
of multiple single munitions with no subunits.
Conclusion
It seems that cluster munitions are suited for a form of warfare unlikely in modern
conflict. Those who would support their use,
however, are undermined by the lack of evidence of military efficacy and drowned out
by those voices against cluster munitions that
have growing evidence to support their point.
Not only are cluster munitions viewed as an
indiscriminate weapon in their mechanism of
area effect, but in the past they also have been
used in a seemingly indiscriminate manner,
leaving a profound legacy.
Military forces would do well to identify
the circumstances in which cluster munitions
have conferred a real military advantage over
other munitions, and to provide recommendations for the development of viable alternatives and better guidance for commanders
on how and when to use such weapons. There
need to be more rigorous restrictions put
on munitions’ undetonation rates and selfdestruct features.
Three distinct constituencies appear to be
forming in response to the Oslo Process as it
pursues a wholesale ban on all cluster bombs.
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The ideas expressed in this article are those
of the author and do not ref lect those of the
British Royal Marines or any organization
with which the author is affiliated.
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